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Abstract—Three network architectures, compatible with pas-
sive optical networks, for future hybrid quantum-classical net-
works are proposed and compared. These setups rely on three
different schemes for quantum key distribution (QKD): BB84,
entanglement-based QKD, and measurement-device-independent
QKD (MDI-QKD). It turns out that, while for small-to-moderate-
size networks BB84 supports the highest secret key generation
rate, it may fail to support large numbers of users. Its cost
implications are also expected to be higher than other setups.
For large networks, MDI-QKD offers the highest key rate if
fast single-photon detectors are employed. Entanglement-based
networks offer the longest security distance among the three
setups. MDI-QKD is, however, the only architecture resilient
to detection loopholes and possibly the most favorable with its
less demanding end-user technology. Entanglement-based and
MDI-QKD setups can both be combined with quantum repeater
systems to allow for long-distance QKD with no trust constraints
on the service provider.
I. INTRODUCTION
Emerging technologies in quantum communications are
anticipated to find their way, sooner or later, into people’s
homes and be part of service packages offered by telecom-
munication operators [1], [2]. The integration of the two
technologies—quantum and classical—is, however, a chal-
lenging task. Classical systems are designed to transfer large
amounts of data quickly and reliably, whereas quantum sys-
tems’ imminent objective is information security. The two
systems will consequently be run in two different regimes
of operation. Classical communications relies on low error-
rate wireless or wired (mainly in the form of optical fibers)
communication links, whereas quantum communications relies
on the single-photon technology and must wrestle with many
implementation challenges. In order to facilitate the deploy-
ment of quantum systems, in coexistence with our current and
future classical services, hybrid quantum-classical networks
need to be developed. This paper addresses this issue from
the architectural standpoint and compares several possible
configurations for such networks.
The proper design of such hybrid networks requires rig-
orous planning by experts in both disciplines. Infrastructural
investments in classical communications are, however, mostly
market driven. This implies that, by the time that technological
as well as socio-economical trends make the deployment of
quantum systems indispensable, such systems are required to
mostly adapt themselves to the existing infrastructure for their
classical counterparts. While it is difficult to fully predict the
structure of future optical networks, the increasing demand for
data communications by the end users has necessitated some
form of fiber-to-the-home (FTTH) architecture. In this paper,
we make the assumption that passive optical networks (PONs)
will be used to connect home users to their immediate central
office and consider quantum cryptography protocols that can
lend themselves to such configurations.
The main quantum application considered in this paper is
quantum key distribution (QKD). QKD enables two users to
securely exchange a secret key—a random sequence of bits—
which can later be used for different cryptography protocols.
QKD is one of the most imminent quantum technologies,
with commercial prospects and immediate public benefits.
Since its introduction at the IBM Research Laboratory in
1984 [3], and its first tabletop demonstration in 1989 [4],
QKD technology has continued to develop, becoming both
cheaper and more accessible. In particular, via its growing
industry, all components of a point-to-point QKD link are now
commercially available. Over the past years, QKD has been
demonstrated over distances as long as 260 km at gigahertz
transmission rates [5]–[7]. Secret key generation rates on the
order of megahertz have also been achieved over optical fibers
carrying classical data [2].
Despite all the progress in QKD, the whole topic of public
QKD is still at its infancy. There are only a handful of the-
oretical or experimental investigations that address multiuser
scenarios such as one-to-many [1], [8], [9] or any-to-any [10]–
[13] networking. Similarly, there are only a few examples of
co-transmission of quantum and classical signals over the same
optical channel [1], [2], [9], [11], [14]–[16]. Further progress
on these, and other, issues is required before we can offer QKD
to every home user. To this end, it is crucial to come up with
a roadmap and to have a vision for how such hybrid networks
may look like in the future.
To respond to the above needs, this paper sheds some
light on the architectural aspects of hybrid quantum-classical
networks. It considers several viable solutions and compares
and contrasts them in terms of their performance, reliability
and cost for the end users. By looking at the compatibility of
the proposed configurations to that of quantum repeaters [17]–
[20], we also discuss the possible extension of these setups to
wide area networks (WANs).
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Sec.
II, we review point-to-point QKD over dark and commercial
fibers. We then compare three viable architectures for quantum
communications over PON systems in Sec. III. Section IV
investigates the possible extension of these networks to long-
distance WANs using quantum repeater setups. We conclude
the paper in Sec. V.
II. POINT-TO-POINT QKD
In this section, we first review three main QKD schemes,
namely, BB84 [3], entanglement-based [21], and measurement-
device-independent (MDI) [22] protocols, in the two-user
scenario. The extension to the multi-user case will be discussed
in Sec. III. Here, we first consider the case when the two users
are allocated a dedicated channel. We will then consider using
a commercial fiber channel when both classical and quantum
signals use the same medium.
A. QKD over dedicated channels
1) BB84: The BB84 protocol enables two parties, namely,
Alice and Bob, to securely exchange, or, more precisely, extend
a secret key sequence; see Fig. 1(a). It performs this task
through the following steps. Alice first encodes single photons
with a raw key and send them to Bob. Encoding is done
in two, randomly chosen, nonorthogonal polarization/phase
bases. The bases will be revealed later, via authenticated
classical communications, in order that Alice and Bob turn
their raw keys into sifted keys by keeping only the bits for
which the same basis has been used for encoding and decoding.
In the next step, Alice and Bob attempt to correct for possible
discrepancies in their sifted keys by using error-correction
techniques. If they find the quantum bit error rate (QBER) too
high, they will abort the protocol, otherwise they apply privacy
amplification to their corrected keys to bring the amount of
leaked information to eavesdroppers below a desired threshold.
In a variant of BB84, known as the decoy-state protocol [23],
by accepting a minor performance degradation, weak laser
pulses replace ideal single photons. In this paper, we use the
latter protocol for its practical implementation advantages.
The secret key generation rate per transmitted pulse, for a
BB84 protocol that uses decoy coherent states and threshold
detectors for its implementation, in the limit of an infinitely
long key, is lower bounded by max[0; RBB84], where [23]
RBB84 = q ( fQH(E) +Q1[1 H(e1)]) ; (1)
where H(p) =  p log2 p  (1  p) log2(1 p), for 0  p  1,
f  1 is the error correction inefficiency,
Q = 1  (1 Y0)e  and E = [e0Y0+ ed(1  e )]=Q
(2)
are, respectively, the overall gain and the QBER,
Q1 = Y1e
  and e1 = (Y0=2 + ed)=Y1 (3)
are, respectively, the gain and the error rate of a single-
photon state,  is the average number of photons in a signal
pulse, Y1 = Y0 + (1   Y0) is the yield of a single-photon
state,  is the total transmissivity of the link including the
efficiency of Bob’s detectors, ed represents the misalignment
error, and Y0 is the probability of a click on the receiver’s side
without having any incident photons from Alice. In a point-
to-point link, Y0, the yield of the vacuum state, models the
photodetectors’ dark current and the background noise. In a
hybrid network, Y0 must also include the interference noise
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Fig. 1. Three different QKD schemes: (a) BB84, where one user is the
transmitter, and the other one the receiver; (b) entanglement-based QKD,
where the source could be with a third untrusted party (service provider),
and the users must be able to do detection measurements; and (c) MDI-QKD,
where both users have BB84 encoders and measurements can be done by the
third party.
from other active, quantum or classical, users. Variations in
Y0 will correspondingly modify the gain and error-rate terms
in (2) and (3), and would result in a change in the key rate, as
we investigate in the following sections. In (1), q = 1=2 if the
two bases are chosen with the same probability. If one uses
the asymmetric protocol in [24], in which one basis is used
more often than the other, q can approach 1.
2) Entanglement-based QKD: An alternative approach to
BB84 is entanglement-based QKD. In this protocol, Alice
and Bob ideally share a maximally entangled state, on which
they perform one of the two BB84 measurements. Again, if
they both use the same measurement basis, they expect to get
correlated measurement results, which constitute their sifted
keys. The rest of the protocol is similar to that of BB84.
Eavesdropping attacks will be detected by the criteria set by
the Bell’s inequalities [21], or excessive QBER [25]. In the
link of Fig. 1(b), when ideal Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR)
states are used, the secret key generation rate per EPR pair
sent is lower bounded by
REPR = qQe ( fH(eQ) + 1 H(eQ)) ; (4)
where, ignoring double-click events,
Qe = AB + (A + B   2AB)Y0 + (1  AB)Y 20 (5)
is the chance of getting a click on both sides, and
eQQe = edAB+1=2[(A+B 2AB)Y0+(1 AB)Y 20 ];
(6)
where eQ is the QBER. In (5) and (6), A and B are,
respectively, the total transmission efficiencies from the EPR
source of Fig. 1(b) to Alice and Bob’s detectors, including
their detectors’ quantum efficiencies.
3) MDI-QKD: The third scheme is a combination of the
two schemes above and relies on the reverse EPR protocol
[26]. In MDI-QKD, Alice and Bob both encode their photons
according to the BB84 protocol and send them to a middle
station where a third, possibly untrusted, party performs a
Bell-state measurement (BSM) on the transmitted photons; see
Fig. 1(c). The results of the BSMs are sent to Alice and Bob,
who, after sifting, will come up with correlated sifted keys.
Post processing will be performed similarly to other QKD
protocols. Decoy states can also be used in MDI-QKD, as
we do in this paper, giving rise to the following secret key
generation rate per pulse sent by Alice and Bob [27]
RMDI = [Q11(1 H(e11;X))  fQ;ZH(E;Z)]; (7)
where  () is the average number of photons for signal states
sent by Alice (Bob), and
Q11 = e
  Y11; (8)
Y11 = (1  dc)2 [ab=2 + (2a + 2b   3ab)dc
+4(1  a)(1  b)2dc

; (9)
e11;XY11 = Y11=2  (0:5  ed)(1  dc)2ab=2; (10)
Q;Z = QC +QE ;
E;ZQ;Z = edQC + (1  ed)QE ; (11)
where
QC = 2(1  dc)2e 0=2
1  (1  dc)e aa=2
 
1  (1  dc)e bb=2

;
QE = Y0(1  dc)2e 0=2[I0(2x)  (1  dc)e 0=2]:(12)
In above equations, I0(x) is the modified Bessel function of
the first kind and
x =
p
ab=2;
0 = a+ b;
(13)
where a (b) is the transmission efficiency for the Alice’s
(Bob’s) link, and dc = Y0=2. The BSM operation is assumed
to be partial performed by, e.g., the linear optics module used
in [22].
Aside from the technical differences between the above
three schemes, what distinguishes them for us, in this paper,
is their architectures. In Fig. 1(a), each user needs to have both
the transmitter (encoder) and the receiver (decoder) modules,
and the role of the service provider is to create a clear path
between them. In Fig. 1(b), users only need measurement
modules, and the source is being controlled by the service
provider. Finally, in Fig. 1(c), all measurements are performed
by the service provider and the users are equipped with
BB84 encoders. In the following section, we discuss how the
difference in the structure of each link will manifest itself in
the performance, reliability, and the cost of the corresponding
network.
B. QKD over commercial channels
In order to have cost-efficient hybrid networks, it is
essential that quantum and classical systems use the same
infrastructure. Considering the high cost of laying optical
fibers under the ground, and the increasing demand for data
communications, the available bandwidth must efficiently be
used. Communicating quantum and classical signals over the
same optical fiber is, however, one of the key challenges in
integrating quantum and classical systems. At first sight, one
possible solution is the assignment of different wavelength
channels and/or bands to each system. This seems to be
particularly practical because of the range of equipment and
expertise available in both the conventional (around 1550 nm)
and the original (around 1310 nm) bands of an optical fiber.
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Fig. 2. Three different LAN/MAN architectures for QKD networks based
on (a) BB84, (b) entanglement-based QKD, and (c) MDI-QKD.
The challenge will still remain, however, because of different
regimes of power at which the two systems operate. For
classical optical systems, it is customary to send milliwatts of
power for data transmission, whereas in QKD we are dealing
with single-photon pulses. This implies that, even if we assign
two different wavelength channels to each system, the crosstalk
noise from the classical signals can still bury our single-photon
signals.
The main source of crosstalk in hybrid links is backward
Raman scattering [1], [2], [15], [16]. For the receiver part of
a quantum node, the strongest crosstalk contribution comes
from the classical transmitter at that node. As a general
wavelength allocation rule, one should try to assign the farthest
possible channels to the classical transmitter and the quantum
receiver of each user [2]. This will minimize the required
spectral filtering for the quantum user. In general, however, in
addition to spectral filtering one should use different temporal
techniques to further reduce the crosstalk noise. In [2], authors
have used very short temporal gates for their self-differencing
detectors. In [1], the off time in an on-off keyed (OOK)
classical signal has been used for quantum transmission. This
method is, however, limited to time-division multiple access
(TDMA) networks that use OOK signaling.
Regardless of the method used for multiplexing classical
and quantum signals and its corresponding demultiplexing-
filtering technique, it is expected, especially in the network sce-
nario, that some background noise would leak from classical
signals to quantum channels. In our forthcoming analysis, we
assume that this background noise is constant. We also assume
that the classical side of the network will be run independently
and only focus on the quantum side of each setup [13].
III. LOCAL/METROPOLITAN AREA
QUANTUM-CLASSICAL NETWORKS
Based on the three setups of Fig. 1, one can design three
different configurations for a local/metropolitan area network
(LAN/MAN); see Fig. 2. Such QKD networks are expected
to have the following desired features. First, every two users
must be able to exchange a secret key without trusting any
other users. Their architecture must also be compatible with
the structure of PONs. Their total cost per user, and for the
end user, needs to be kept low as well. Each user is able
to classically communicate data, on the same platform but
possibly on a different channel setting than that of the quantum
system. The last requirement, we assume, has been achieved
by proper channel allocation and the use of relevant equipment
to multiplex and demultiplex classical and quantum signals.
A. BB84 Network
Figure 2(a) shows a possible QKD setup between two
PONs based on the BB84 protocol. The extension to multiple
PONs is straightforward and will be neglected here. In this
configuration, the above requirements have been met by al-
locating quantum encoder (Tx) as well as quantum decoder
(Rx) components to each user. The users in this network
are connected via a switching center, which routes packets
between designated users. By using proper multiple-access
techniques, multiple pairs of users can exchange secret keys.
In this paper, we assume that users are time multiplexed, and
that all necessary coordination steps are conducted over the
classical channels. As shown in [13], TDMA minimizes the
interference from other quantum users and is also compatible
with most PON systems in operation today. We also assume
that the switching center can enable two users belonging to
the same PON to communicate with each other.
Assuming N home users for each of the two PONs, the
secret key exchange rate between any two network users is
given by
R1 = RBB84Rp=N; (14)
where Rp=N is the rate at which coherent QKD pulses are
sent by the Alice user in a TDMA setup with N time slots
[13]. In (14), RBB84 is given by (1) at  = dL=N2, where
d is the quantum efficiency of single-photon detectors and L
is the path-coupling loss over a distance L. Here, we assume
that the length of fiber between any two users is identical and
it is equal to L. The factor N2 is due to the splitters’ loss
at the PONs. In principle, one can use wavelength-division
multiplexing to avoid this loss, but then the required channel
resources are linearly increasing as well. In this paper, we
restrict ourselves to a single-wavelength per PON, noting that
by including additional wavelength channels the capacity of
all setups in Fig. 2 will correspondingly improve. We also
consider a fixed amount of crosstalk noise for each user. Given
that the backscattered Raman noise is the major source of
crosstalk, the recipient QKD user’s classical transmission is
considered to be the main contributor to this noise.
B. Entanglement-based QKD Network
With similar assumptions as above, one can devise a QKD
network based on entanglement-based protocols; see Fig. 2(b).
Here, the service provider sends pairs of entangled photons
to any two users who wish to exchange a secret key, and the
respective users will only need to perform QKD measurements
on the received photons. That will in principle include the case
where the two users belong to the same PON, although, in this
case, additional switches (not shown in the figure) and time
coordination may be needed. The secret key generation rate is
then given by
R2 = REPRRp=N; (15)
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Fig. 3. Rate versus number of users for the three network architectures of
Fig. 2. In all curves, dark count is 10 6 per pulse, d = 0:5, and L = 30 km.
Crosstalk noise is 10 6 per pulse for BB84 and EPR protocols, and twice as
much for MDI-QKD. Rp is assumed to be 1 G pulse/s for BB84 and MDI-
QKD, and 10 M pulse/s for the EPR protocol. We also assume 0.2 dB/km
channel loss, ed = 0, f = 1:16, q = 1, and  =  = 0:48.
where REPR is calculated from (4) at A = B = d
p
L=N ,
assuming that the distance of each user to the EPR source is
identical. Rp=N , here, is the rate at which entangled photons
are sent to the two users, and is typically less than the repetition
rate for laser pulses [28]. Multiple sources may be used in
this architecture to improve the key rate and the number of
users supported per unit of time. Again the major source of
crosstalk is that produced by the two end users once they
transmit classical signals.
C. MDI-QKD Network
Finally, Fig. 2(c) shows the corresponding setup for an
MDI-QKD network. In this setup, all users are equipped with
BB84 encoders, which, except for the degree of freedom in
which information is encoded, ideally generate indistinguish-
able photons. Under this condition, the secret key generation
rate is given by
R3 = RMDIRp=N; (16)
where RMDI is calculated from (7) at a = b = d
p
L=N ,
assuming that all users have the same distance to the BSM
module. Rp=N , here, is the rate at which coherent QKD pulses
are sent to the Bell-state analyzer. In our TDMA setup, it is
then assumed that the deadtime of the single-photon detectors
used in the BSM module is less than the TDMA time slot [29].
If not, the service provider may need to employ multiple BSM
modules with additional switches to direct each photon to the
relevant measurement site. Additional arrangements are also
needed if the two users of interest are from the same PON.
The crosstalk noise in this setup is expected to be twice as
high as the other two schemes, because of having two optical
line terminals corresponding to the two PONs.
D. Performance Comparison
There are several measures by which QKD systems can be
compared. The secret key generation rate, as discussed so far, is
one of them. Another one is the security distance within which
secret exchange of keys is possible. In the network scenario
the number of users supported and their impact on the former
two parameters are also matters of interest.
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Fig. 4. Rate versus distance for our three network architectures at N = 32.
All other parameters are the same as that of Fig. 3.
Figure 3 shows the secret key generation rate, based on
(14)-(16), for each of the three schemes discussed as a function
of the number of users in each PON. We have considered a
fixed distance of L = 30 km, which covers a metropolitan
area, and different pulse repetition rates for each system. In
MDI-QKD and BB84, Rp = 1 G pulse/s, corresponding
to the available pulsed laser technology. For EPR protocol,
however, Rp = 10 M pulse/s corresponding to the existing
technologies for the EPR-pair generation [30]. The cross talk
noise is assumed to be the same for BB84 and EPR-based
QKD, but twice as much for MDI-QKD. It is evident from
the figure that while BB84 offers the best key rate for up to
around 60 users, its key rate eventually goes to zero at this
value. MDI-QKD offers the best key exchange rate when it
comes to moderate or large number of users. The main reason
for this effect is the sensitivity of each scheme to the path loss
as discussed next.
Among the three proposed network setups, EPR-based
QKD has the largest security distance. MDI-QKD comes
second with a reasonably long security distance exceeding
100 km. This has been demonstrated in Fig. 4, where, for a
fixed number of users at 32, we have plotted the key rate versus
distance. As compared to BB84, MDI-QKD and the EPR
protocol are less sensitive to channel loss, or correspondingly
to dark counts, as their photons should travel half the distance
before being detected, and that would result in longer security
distances.
Figure 4 highlights an important feature of single-photon-
based QKD techniques: their key rate exponentially decays
with distance. To remedy this effect and also to extend the
security distance, quantum repeaters have been proposed. In
Sec. IV, we look at the integration of our proposed setups
with that of quantum repeaters to find suitable hybrid WAN
architectures.
E. Cost and Reliability
The design and the development of hybrid quantum-
classical networks are expected to be highly impacted by
the market and, in that regard, the cost of the system is of
paramount importance. While it is difficult to put a price on a
technology that is still developing and has not yet introduced
at mass scales, we can make certain observations, based on
the current trends, and compare the three proposed setups in
terms of cost and reliability factors, as we discuss below.
Each quantum network in Fig. 2 is composed of vari-
ous components. At the the encoder side, we typically need
(pulsed) lasers/EPR sources, polarizers/phase interferometers,
amplitude modulators and drivers, random number generators,
and the corresponding electronics that control the whole sys-
tem. At the decoder side, among other things, single-photon
detectors and their corresponding electronics as well as polariz-
ers and beam splitters are required. Classical communications
is also needed to coordinate between the users and also to
facilitate the post-processing stages of QKD. Which side will
turn out more expensive is partly a matter of equipment used in
each part. In order to gain some insight, here, we oversimplify
the problem and denote, in all three setups, the total cost of
the encoder unit by Cenc and that of the decoder unit by Cdec.
The total cost of each of the setups in Fig. 2 is then given by
CBB84 = 2NCenc + 2NCdec + Cnet;
CEPR = NEPRCenc + 2NCdec + Cnet;
CMDI QKD = 2NCenc +NBSMCdec + Cnet; (17)
where Cnet is the cost of the classical components of the
network such as switches and transceivers, and NEPR and
NBSM are, respectively, the number of EPR sources and BSM
modules used in Figs. 2(b) and (c).
The first observation to be made is that the cost of the
equipment held by the end user in the BB84 setup is roughly
twice as high as that of the other two setups. This is by itself a
disadvantage, as service providers will prefer to have the low
cost equipment at the end user’s side and keep bulky/expensive
elements within the network, where they can be shared among
all users, thereby reducing the total cost per user. In the
architectures of Figs. 2(b) and (c), that could be done by
varying NEPR and NBSM according to the traffic demands
of the network.
Another point of interest is that it is generally perceived
that the encoding task in QKD is possibly less demanding
than that of detecting single photons, which at some point
may rely on superconducting technology [7], [31], [32]. That
would favor setups where the number of detectors have been
minimized, which in our case is the MDI-QKD network.
Moreover, while in most demonstrated attacks on QKD the
detectors are compromised [33]–[38], MDI-QKD enjoys re-
silience to detection loopholes. That will make MDI-QKD the
most reliable solution, among those discussed in this paper,
for the public implementation of QKD.
IV. WIDE AREA QUANTUM-CLASSICAL NETWORKS
Future hybrid quantum-classical networks must accom-
modate quantum services, such as QKD, to any two users
at any distance. Nevertheless, as shown in Fig. 4, the path
loss has a deteriorating effect on the secret key generation
rate and eventually on the security of the QKD protocol.
One solution that achieves better rate-versus-distance scaling
is that of quantum repeaters. Quantum repeaters were origi-
nally proposed to distribute entanglement between two remote
quantum memories [17]. The enabling idea was based on
first distributing entanglement over shorter segments, and then
extending it to longer distances by performing BSMs, similar
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Fig. 5. (a) A possible architecture for hybrid quantum-classical WANs based
on MDI-QKD over quantum repeaters. (b) Rate, per pulse, versus distance
for a single-node MDI-QKD system that uses entangled memories. Memories
are entangled according to the protocol proposed in [39] using optimal values
for the source transmission coefficients. Here, n represents the nesting level
for the repeater protocol and d = 0:3, f = 1, memory writing (reading)
efficiency is 0.5 (0.7), and double-photon probability is 10 4. Channel loss
is 0.17 dB/km and all other parameters are the same as that of Fig. 3.
to the ones used in MDI-QKD, on middle memories. This
approach is naturally compatible with EPR-based and MDI-
QKD protocols. In the former case, the EPR source in Fig. 2(b)
is replaced by quantum memories, which are now entangled
by a quantum repeater. One just needs to read, i.e., convert
their internal states into photonic states, to generate entangled
photons similar to the ones generated by an EPR source [40].
In the latter, one needs to perform BSMs on the photons read
from entangled memories and those sent by the two users; see
Fig. 5(a). Extending the BB84 network to longer distances,
by adding intermediate nodes, is also possible, but then one
needs to trust these middle nodes via which the final key is
distributed between the two end users [10], [41]. This scenario
is only acceptable if the service provider is considered to be
trustworthy.
Based on the results obtained in the previous section,
MDI-QKD is possibly the favorite option in quantum-classical
WANs. Figure 5(b) shows some preliminary results on
how MDI-QKD performs on the quantum repeater setup of
Fig. 5(a). In our calculations, we have used a particular
protocol for quantum repeaters as proposed in [39]. This
protocol relies on a probabilistic approach to BSMs. Here, we
have, however, assumed that entangled memories are available
at any time needed by the users of interest, and have only
accounted for the possible degradation of entangled states as
distributed by the repeater protocol [42]. Within the parameter
setting used, it can be seen that the addition of quantum
memories in a quantum repeater setup can stretch the security
distance to longer distances than what can be achieved without
repeaters. The security distance will increase by increasing the
nesting level, n, where 2n is the number of segments in the
quantum repeater. Further analysis is required to estimate the
total secret key generation rate once more practical restrictions
are considered in the repeater system.
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this paper, we discussed the possible deployment
of quantum technologies, such as QKD, in future hybrid
quantum-classical networks. The main objective was to use
the same infrastructure that would be in use for classical
optical communications. With demand for FTTH services on
the rise, we proposed the extension of three point-to-point
QKD schemes over PONs. The three schemes considered were
the original BB84 and EPR protocols alongside the recently
proposed MDI-QKD scheme. These setups had different con-
figurations in terms of where quantum encoders and decoders
would be located and the role of service provider in each
case. It turned out that, while for small-to-moderate-size PONs
BB84 would offer the highest key rate, MDI-QKD could
accommodate a larger number of users at higher distances. We
also showed that the MDI-QKD architecture could be com-
bined with quantum repeater setups to enable long-distance
quantum communications for WAN users. Nevertheless, many
technological challenges must be resolved before having an
operational hybrid quantum-classical WAN.
Our comparison will not be complete without considering
other emerging technologies. For instance, coherent optical
communications seems to be the main player in future op-
tical fiber networks and the integration of QKD with such
systems requires further analysis. This includes the use of
optical orthogonal frequency division multiplexing for quan-
tum and classical users. Another area of interest is the role of
continuous-variable QKD in coherent optical networks [43].
Finally, satellite QKD [44] and its role in long-distance quan-
tum communications, along with possible relativistic effects,
must be scrutinized before finalizing the design of future
hybrid quantum-classical networks.
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